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Architecture and Attachment: Carceral Collectivism and the Problem of Prison 
Reform in Russia and Georgia  
 
Laura Piacentini1 and Gavin Slade 
 
Abstract 
This article looks at the trajectory of prison reform in post-Soviet Georgia and Russia. It 
attempts to understand recent developments through an analysis of the resilient legacies of 
the culture of punishment born out of the Soviet period. To do this, the article fleshes out the 
concept of carceral collectivism, which refers to the practices and beliefs that made up prison 
life in Soviet and now post-Soviet countries. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
revealed a penal culture in notable need of reform. Less obvious, in retrospect, was how over 
the course of a cenWXU\ WKLV SUHGRPLQDQWO\ µFROOHFWLYLVW¶ FXOWXUH RI SXQLVKPHQW ZDV
instantiated in routine penal practices that stand in opposition to Western penalities. The 
article shows how the social and physical structuring of collectivism and penal self-
governance have remained resilient in the post-Soviet period despite diverging attempts at 
reform in Russia and Georgia. The paper argues that persistent architectural forms and 
cultural attachment to collectivism constitute this resilience. Finally, the article asks how 
studies of collectivist punishment in the post-Soviet region might inform emerging debates 
about the reform and restructuring of individualizing, cell-based prisons in Western 
jurisdictions.   
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this article is to discuss the enduring resilience of carceral collectivism in 
Georgian and Russian penal colonies. Remarkably little sociological and theoretical analysis 
has been published on post-Soviet punishment forms despite the history of the Soviet system 
looming large and vast across Europe and beyond. The word µcollectivism¶ shapes Russian 
culture DV DQ µREMHFW RI NQRZOHGJH DQG DFWLRQ¶ (Kharkhordin, 1999:75). The term derives 
from the Russian word kollektiv, which were the institutions reflecting both a familiar aspect 
of Russian everyday life and, most often, the kollektiv applied to a group of colleagues at 
work, on a farm or in the factory (Rosenberg, 1984)2. For the purpose of this paper we define 
kollektiv as a group of people united and linked to a common cause in a range of public 
institutions (Getmanec, 1978)3. Proudly cited as an organisational innovation by the Soviets, 
one of the most striking expressions of collectivism can be found in the prison environments 
of both post-Soviet Georgia and Russia. 
Carceral collectivism is grounded by three elements: a system of penal governance 
based on mutual peer surveillance, the dispersal of authority and governance to prisoners 
themselves, and communal living engendered by the spatial and temporal structuring of 
prison life through the housing of prisoners en masse in dormitories. In this article, we will 
flesh out this definition, demonstrate how carceral collectivism has survived the Soviet Union 
in the prisons of Georgia and Russia, and suggest how its enduring nature might help 
understand both the problems of prison reform in the post-Soviet region, and the 
exceptionality of penality in this region for the field of prison sociology broadly defined. 
Attempts to reform prison systems vary across the post-Soviet region. Explaining this 
variation is not the primary focus of this paper. Instead, we limit our analysis to Georgia and 
Russia. These countries interest us because they are considered forerunners in prison reform 
                                                          
2 Moreover, it is a term that exists in the abstract because its widespread use makes it difficult to pin down 
theoretically. 
3 We acknowledge here the important debate over the XQKHOSIXOFDWHJRULVDWLRQRIµLQGLYLGXDOV¶DQGµFROOHFWLYHV¶
in Russia and agree with Kharkhordin that the distinctions are subtler and cannot be simplified according to two 
categories. Throughout the twentieth century in Russia, at the centre of the idea of the collective was self-
perfection (see also Morris, 1972). To give collectivism some cultural coherence, therefore, an individual had to 
perfect loyalty to Socialism. Hence the individual cannot be prized out of the debate on collectivism 
(Kharkhordin, 1999). 
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in the region.4 As we detail in this paper, Russia has set out a deep and comprehensive reform 
project, building on changes introduced in the 1990s. Georgia has, since 2005, overhauled its 
penitentiary system, deliberately destroying Soviet-style camps in an effort to make a break 
with the past. Both case studies, however, also reveal inertial legacies that have led to 
mounting difficulties in the reform process. We argue that this was in large part due to the 
fact that cultural values, whilst being an internal characteristic of penality (Garland, 1990; 
Smith, 2008), were not considered in any assessment of penal reform priorities. We argue 
that this has been an important factor leading to resistance and failures in the reform projects. 
There is certainly a story here about ill chosen reform paths at the level of policy-making as 
well as failures of political will. This is not our focus in this paper however. We are interested 
in the cultural obstacles to initiated reforms once they reach the level of the prison.  
The paper first outlines the collectivist nature of Soviet culture and its effects on 
punishment forms in the Soviet Union. We next look at how penal reform policy was 
rationalised in the post-Soviet space in terms of the governance of human rights. We then 
describe in detail the wide-ranging penal reform projects in our case studies ± Georgia and 
Russia. In the final part of our paper we examine the implications for how the elementary 
characteristic of collectivism, which is how prisoners are held in space, is resilient in 
punishment forms. The resilience of carceral collectivism, we suggest, is constituted by two 
factors: architecture and attachment. Firstly, it is embedded in architectural forms that have 
not been seriously tackled by reforms; secondly, the practices that constitute carceral 
collectivism have both instrumental value for prisoners and prison governors as well as 
making cultural common sense.  
From this perspective we argue, in conclusion, that study of the post-6RYLHWUHJLRQ¶V
penal culture opens up new debates in prison sociology. First of all it concerns how reform 
must deal with questions of penal cultural norms and their fragmentation into penal 
architecture and structures, enabling residues of prior regimes to endure. Second, and 
relatedly, we suggest that in the west recent arguments that greater communality in prison 
and prison architecture can produce better prisons would do well to take a comparative 
approach and look east on this issue. Finally, we believe that prison reform and culture are all 
                                                          
4 There is one exception to this ± Estonia. Estonia moved to a fully Western style cellular prison system in the 
1990s. We do not include it in this discussion as its small population size and even smaller prison system 
combined with its proximity to Europe and membership of the European Union make it the one case in which 
FDUFHUDOFROOHFWLYLVPGLGQRWSUHVHQWDPDMRUREVWDFOHWRUHIRUP,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW(VWRQLD¶VELJJHU
neighbours, Latvia and Lithuania, which ran much larger systems of collective Soviet colonies have failed to 
reform and have experienced similar problems to the ones we describe in this paper for Russia and Georgia.  
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the more pressing in parts of the world, such as Russia, where democracy is fragile, civil 
society is weak and the protection of vulnerable persons, including prisoners, is far from 
assured.  
 
 
Collectivism as Soviet (penal) order 
The term kollektiv has a long history in Russia. The concept emphasised a present and a 
future culture in every Soviet school, factory and public body, including criminal justice 
institutions. There is much scholarly debate over whether the kollektiv was a voluntary group 
dynamic (see Dontsov, 1984 and Khakhordin, 1999). Indeed, the systematic reality of Soviet 
life meant that groups were not freely assembled but were units of socialist production 
embedded in a political strategy working towards a common socialist rationale. Underlying 
this rationale peer pressure, discipline and fear, including the use of criminal law and 
imprisonment, mobilized common economic and common goals. Collectivism in the Soviet 
Union has thus been described as a form of µWRWDOLWDULDQ VXUYHLOODQFH-oriented bio-SROLWLFV¶
(Los, 2004: 22) where a system of mutual surveillance existed.  
There were different scales and forms of collectiveness, yet all were undergirded by a 
notion of self-governance (Kharkhordin, 1999). Surveillance in the Soviet Union was 
distinctive from the West insofar as it was a form of both horizontal and hierarchical 
discipline; µa network of surveilling peers mediated by the kollektiv[s]¶ (Kharkhordin, 1999: 
122)5. All social institutions were sites of collective information gathering for the Soviet 
secret police and penal establishments were folded into the catechism of collectivism also. 
Kharkhordin, a prominent theorist of Soviet society (1999: 110), writes:  
µ0XWXDO VXUYHLOODQFH LV WKH UHOLDEOH EHGURFN RI 6RYLHW SRZHU...surveillance of 
everybody by everybody else is not a clever institutional trick adopted as a last resort when 
nothing else is working; on the contrary, this is the ever present rock bottom that one reaches 
upon dismantling mountains of power. If this bedrock dissolves, Soviet power disappears: 
hierarchies crumble and pyramids collapse. Mutual surveillance sets the cornerstone of Soviet 
SRZHUZLWKRXWLWWKH6RYLHW8QLRQFRXOGQHYHUKDYHH[LVWHG¶ (Kharkhordin, 1999: 110). 
                                                          
5 Although we would caution against a clear distinction between the two axes of horizontal and hierarchical 
surveillance outlined in the USSR as it cannot adequately explain the varying kinds of collective surveillance 
that occurred.  
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These reflections on the nature of power in Soviet society allow us to delineate a form 
of penal order we have called carceral collectivism. Carceral collectivism was based in part 
on the mutual surveillance identified by Kharkhordin in sites of punishment. This 
surveillance was cultivated by distinct penal architectural forms. It was used to enforce 
cultural standards, legal rules, and political as well as informal norms. This form of prison 
order based on mutual surveillance, we suggest, must be distinguished from the dominant 
concept in Western penology of the panopticon, the few watching the many (Bentham 2011; 
Foucault 1977; Haggerty & Ericson 2000). Instead, order is intentionally built into Soviet and 
post-Soviet prisons by what we term the polyopticon ± the many watching the many. The 
shared background of collectiveness in penal norms and practices endowed the notion of the 
polyopticon with a certain kind of common sense formed against a cultural background of 
self-development through surveillance. Penal order was maintained through establishing 
group standards and, importantly, the collective came to be entrusted with the task of 
controlling itself through mutual surveillance. 
In the process of recasting convicts as members of a mutually surveilled kollektiv, 
prisoners held positions of formal authority. The degree to which prisoners became self-
governing makes the Soviet prison distinct from Western forms of penality. In Soviet camps, 
prisoners were required to enrol in organisations VXFK DV WKH µVDQLWDU\ VHFWLRQ¶ WKH
µSURGXFWLRQVHFWLRQ¶DQGWKHVHFWLRQIRUµODZYLRODWLRQV¶Diverse prisoner councils were self-
organising, arranging everyday life and dispersing penal discipline (Abramkin and 
Chesnokova, 1993). The logic of Soviet penal culture can, to some extent, be viewed as a 
product of the meticulous planning of collective surveillance under the thinly veiled disguise 
RI µFROOHFWLYH FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ 7KLV GUDPDWLFDOO\ DOWHUHG WKH QDWXUH DQG RSHUDWLRQ RI
punishment, because as Barnes (2011) notes, prison life was where collective life dominated 
and prisoners learned to live on Soviet terms. Conceptions of the µFROOHFWLYH¶DQGµLQGLYLGXDO¶
came to be ambiguously twisted due to mutual surveillance of peers and state terror. Indeed, 
nobody ever quite knew who was an enemy and who was not.  
$V *RIIPDQ  QRWHV LQ KLV WKHRU\ RI µDGMXVWPHQW¶ DOO penal space is 
territorialised through the internal order of the institution, and the external order of social 
structures. When considered in the cases of Georgia and Russia, adjustment occurs in a 
peculiar penal sub-cultural form where deprived of freedom DV µLQGLYLGXDOV¶, prisoners then 
participate in a µFROOHFWLYH¶penal experience. Educational collectivities developed. In these, 
µWKH WHDFKHU WKH WXWRU WKH IRUHPDQDQG WKH VWXGHQW¶ 'DQLOLQ  converged on penal 
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doctrine turning µthe organs of the inmate collectives into partners on an equal footing with 
WKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶3DSNLQAs Papkin (1988) further QRWHVWKLVµLQFUHDVHG>WKH@
role of mutual dependency and responsibility, making it necessary for members of the 
FROOHFWLYH WR HYDOXDWH DQG LQIOXHQFH HDFK RWKHU¶ (ibid, 169). Across the USSR, µUHODWLRQV
EHWZHHQ FRPUDGHV¶ DUH µQRW D PDWWHU RI IULHQGship, love or close contact, but one of 
UHVSRQVLEOHGHSHQGHQF\¶'DQLOLQ 
As well as formal authority roles, a separate system of informal order existed in 
parallel among prisoners with the consent of prison administrations. Recidivists belonging to 
an elite subcultural caste known as vory-v-zakone (thieves-in-law) were co-opted by the 
authorities to maintain order and repress political prisoners. This particular elite prisoner 
group are thought to have emerged in the 1930s (Applebaum 2003; Varese 2001). They 
survived the changes throughout the Soviet period and exist in the post-Soviet period most 
IDPRXVO\DVRQHPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKHµ5XVVLDQPDILD¶WKRXJKLQIDFWWKH\KDYHDOZD\VGUDZQ
members from all ethnicities (Chalidze 1977; Gurov 1995; Varese 2001). The emboldening 
of the power of these criminals by the 1970s and 1980s became a particular problem in the 
Georgian prison system (Slade 2013). 
In both formal and informal ways, then, the Soviet penal system went beyond 
cooperation and the coproduction of order to the full dispersal of authority and the problem of 
order onto the prisoners themselves. Extensive mutual surveillance developed under the 
auspices of the prison administration and that of the informal governance of the criminal 
elite. 7KHµNQRFNHUV¶DQLQIRUPDQWwere those prisoners who collected information for the 
regime, while the µRYHUVHHUV¶ worked on behalf of the prisoner elite. There was a form of 
µGRXEOHVXUYHLOODQFH¶DQGLQIRUPDWLRQFLUFXODWHGZLWKLQERWKIRUPDODQGinformal systems of 
power.  
This interplay of formal enlistment and informal co-optation by the prison 
administration made oversight of discipline and conflict resolution all the more manageable 
through the architectural forms of the Soviet prison camp. Collective living in otryady, 
detachment blocks, or barracks, of two or three-story brick buildings containing mass 
dormitories where prisoners lived openly and communally,6 were the main sites for practices 
of carceral collectivism.  
                                                          
6 tĞǁŝůůƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĂƐ ?ďĂƌƌĂĐŬƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ? 
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During the years of the Gulag (from the police camp system of the 1920s to the 
merger of all detention institutions in the 1930s until the early 1950s), carceral collectivism 
grew to exponential proportions becoming a brutal, massive and systematized penal apparatus 
whose broadest function was to enact Soviet economic aspirations and political indoctrination 
through a forced labour detention system of camps, colonies, prisons and internal exile. 
While the scale of the penal system was reduced after the death of Stalin in 1953, 
.KUXVKFKHY¶V SRVW-6WDOLQ µWKDZ¶ (1956-1964) did little to change the harshness of prison 
conditions. The main bases of carceral collectivism were in place until the fall of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. 
One of the aims of the paper is to demonstrate the distinctiveness of Soviet prison 
management in contrast to Western models. In concluding this paper, we will comment on 
how the Soviet and post-Soviet experience speaks to themes and issues in Western penology. 
In this vein, we include Table 1 below to draw out the differences between Soviet and 
Western models of prison governance. 
 Model of prison 
governance 
Prevailing form of 
surveillance 
Instantiation in 
prison design 
 
Role of prisoners 
in order 
maintenance 
 
Western 
capitalist 
countries 
Carceral 
individualism 
Panopticon 
(official 
surveillance of 
prisoners) 
Cellular prison ?
prisoners 
separated  
Informal 
cooperation and 
information 
gathering 
USSR Carceral 
collectivism 
Polyopticon 
(surveillance of 
prisoners by 
prisoners) 
Prison camp ?
prisoners share 
communal living 
spaces 
  
Formalized 
enlistment of 
informants and 
informal 
cooptation of 
authoritative 
prisoners  
Table 1: comparing Soviet and Western forms of penal governance 
In summary, a highly distinct culture of carceral collectivism, born from the 
institution of the kollektiv, served as the model penal style of management of both institutions 
and prisoners. Mutual surveillance, or what we have termed the polyopticon, was the basis 
for such management. The spatial and internal organisational characteristics of the Soviet 
camp (consisting of administrative, domestic and production territories) as well as the 
barracks enabled mutual surveillance and carried forward the culture of carceral collectivism. 
Attachment to the practices and values of carceral collectivism as well as the persistence of 
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architectural forms that engendered these can, in part, explain some of the failings of prison 
reform in the region. Penal architecture emboldened collectivist penal sensibility. We go on 
to discuss precisely these reforms later in the paper. Next, we next outline how prison 
reformers attempted to intervene in this long-lived Soviet penal system as part of a broader 
agenda to promote human rights.  
 
Penal reform, human rights and the state 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a radically different approach to penal 
punishment was called for (Pridemore, 2005; Solomon, 1997). Imprisonment came to be re-
framed away from a totalitarian apparatus to one benefitting from the generative import of 
European norms promoting the rule of law. The picture is complex and incomplete because 
although the appetite was certainly there for new legalities guiding punishment, the capacities 
for acting on these positive responses to reform were patchy (Pridemore, 2005). Indeed one 
could argue that penal reform in this part of the world is highly contested because some penal 
ideas have been abandoned and others maintained.  
All regions of Russia, and all post-Soviet countries including Georgia, inherited the 
Soviet camp prison system (Detkov 1999). Thus, a huge task faced reformers. In post-Soviet 
Russia, early attention focused on pre-trial facilities where overcrowding, death and squalor 
occurred on an industrial scale. Russia joined the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1996, Georgia 
joined in 1999. Both countries had ratified the European Convention of Human Rights by the 
end of the 1990s. These international obligations meant that both Georgia and Russia 
followed similar paths in humanizing their justice systems. Jury trials were re-established, the 
death penalty was abolished or placed under a moratorium, and the management of the 
penitentiary system was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of 
Justice. Both countries originally fostered an openness to international emulation and models 
µensuring that trainers can refer to international instruments and best practice examples, in 
GHOLYHULQJ VSHFLDOLVHG WUDLQLQJ¶ 812'& : 1). With an almost missionary zeal, penal 
reform was pursued with substantial expert input from Europe that led to improvements to a 
ZLGH UDQJH RI OHJDO DQG FULPLQDO VWUXFWXUHV 7KLV ZDV SDUWLFXODUO\ WUXH RI 9ODGLPLU 3XWLQ¶V
first term in office (2000-2003) in 5XVVLD DQG 0LNKHLO 6DDNDVKYLOL¶V ILUVW WHUP LQ *HRUJLD
(2004-2007).  
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For Russia, this reforming period ended somewhat abruptly in 2003 with the arrest of 
the Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkhovsky, the continuing unprecedented ruthlessness of a 
prolonged second war with Chechnya, and numerous failures in applying the jurisprudence of 
the ECHR in the treatment of vulnerable persons, minority groups and prisoners (see 
%RZULQJ  3XWLQ SDUWLFXODUO\ DIWHU KLV ILUVW WHUP KDV IDPRXVO\ UHIUDPHG 5XVVLD¶V
political position as no longer inside the nexus of European obligations. Meanwhile, Georgia 
has maintained its outward commitment to reform within European frameworks while 
backsliding on human rights and democracy. Most significantly, in November 2007 the 
government violently clamped down on a peaceful demonstration and took over an 
opposition-supporting TV channel. Following this, while paying lip-service to its 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV *HRUJLD¶V UHIRUPHG SULVRQ V\VWHP EHFDPH YLUWXDOO\ FORVHG WR WKH
outside world. 
Yet, despite these setbacks, the reality is that the ECHR is now very much part of 
Georgian and Russian law, which means judges, lawyers and penal authorities are trained to 
consider wider European protocols. Penal authority, therefore, cannot reasonably be said to 
be the sole preserve of national sovereignty now that these countries have entered bilateral 
management agreements with European bodies where a domain of external judgement is 
maintained on behalf of European political elites. One of the side-effects of this development 
is the complex and large case law on prisoner rights violations (see Van Zyl Smit and 
Snacken 2009), which test the extent to which managerial and legal reform have indeed been 
transformative.  
Whilst these steps at reform were utterly necessary to deal with the scandalous 
management of prisoners, and were part of a repertoire of measures improving the conduct of 
the penal apparatus, they have been remarkably less concerned with moral or philosophical 
rationales of penal approaches. One such critical but overlooked aspect is the fundamental 
question of the role of the state in the practice of punishment. Political scientists and 
economists have published prolifically on the changing nature of the post-Soviet (weak) state 
in terms of its limited capacity to provide public goods, services, and protections, its 
autonomy from special interest groups, and its legitimacy to wield power (Linz and Stepan, 
1996; Buzan 1997; Weiler 2004; Coppieters & Legvold 2005; Taylor 2011; Mendras 2012). 
Following the Soviet collapse, states emerged that had more democratic potential and greater 
accountability while lacking capacity and immediate legitimacy to act. 
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The role of the state in practices of punishment is a clear area in which questions of 
accountability, autonomy, capacity and legitimacy are highly pertinent. Reform in Russia and 
Georgia so far has been concerned with reframing accountability and allowing international 
oversight. It has been concerned with mapping out internationally tried and tested techniques 
to identify, classify and manage the penal system according to common norms, reshaped 
legal terms, and agreements between governmental bodies. Wider questions about the 
meaning of punishment ± legitimacy - and the overriding use of prison ± capacity ± have been 
largely left to one side. On the former issue, attempts at deep prison reform in Russia and 
Georgia have run into dire, in some cases disastrous, problems of legitimacy. On the latter 
issue, in 2013, out of the ten countries in Europe that had the highest incarceration rates per 
capita, nine were post-Soviet countries. In 2012, the top two countries were Russia and 
Georgia (International Centre for Prison Studies 2012; 2013).  
The issue of post-Soviet penal reform, therefore, is vulnerable to a lack of depth on 
NH\ VRFLRORJLFDO TXHVWLRQV VXFKDV µGR WKHFRXQWULHVRI WKHSRVW-Soviet region now have a 
fundamentally different understanding RI WKH UROH RI WKH VWDWH LQ SULVRQ PDWWHUV"¶ $QG
UHODWHGO\ µZKDW GHSWK FDQ SHQDO UHIRUP UHDFK DERYH DQG EH\RQG µLPSURYHG PDQDJHPHQW¶" 
7KHUH DUH WKUHH LQWHUORFNLQJ LVVXHVKHUH ILUVWO\ SHQDOFXOWXUH YDOXHVQRUPVDQG µIHHOLQJV¶
about incarceration); secondly, penal infrastructure, architecture and the ways it embeds 
cultural values that lead to penal ideas; and thirdly, penal policy, prison populations levels 
and developing a heterogeneity of policies around rehabilitation that connect to real crime 
problems.  
Taking these themes as broadly guiding our discussion, we suggest that the most 
striking penal legacy that reformers in the post-Soviet region have to deal with is that of 
carceral collectivism. We see the effects of this in Georgia and Russia where attempts to 
dismantle the Soviet penal colony in favour of Western-style prisons have either floundered 
or collapsed into controversy. Western countries and organizations continue to push for penal 
reform and the protection of human rights in the post-Soviet region. In achieving such goals, 
the inertial force of carceral collectivism must be acknowledged and engaged with because it 
imposes constraints on penal modernization in both jurisdictions. We now turn our attention 
to more specifically describing reform and its consequences in our two case studies.  
 
Problems of Penal Reform in Georgia and Russia 
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At one time or another since 1991, the political leaderships in both Russia and Georgia have 
declared a willingness to end the Soviet system of labour colonies. The type of reform 
conducted has, however, varied drastically. In Russia, the legal architecture was reformed but 
ponderous discussion about punishment forms and stalled processes have prevailed, whereas 
in Georgia a radical, quick and deep overhaul was carried out. In both cases reforms did not 
fully acknowledge or tackle the architectural form of incarceration and the Sovietized cultural 
sensibility towards collectivism that it incubates7. Due to this, the results of penal reform 
have been structurally and conceptually problematic.  
Georgia  
$V SDUW RI D µ]HUR WROHUDQFH¶ FULPH FRQWURO SROLF\ Whe prison population increased 
300% between 2003 and 2010 and the country became the fourth biggest incarcerator in the 
world proportionately, leapfrogging even Russia. *HRUJLD¶V ODUJHO\XQWRXFKHGDQGFUHDNLQJ
penal infrastructure was overhauled to accommodate this increase. Old prisons and colonies 
were renovated or demolished, new prisons were built from scratch using the gains to the 
budget from new fines and plea-bargaining, aid and loans from abroad. A mass turnover of 
staff within prisons had been implemented with 80% of personnel in some institutions fired 
or told to reapply for their jobs ostensibly to root out corruption (Prison Service Georgia 
2006).  
Other than special facilities for juveniles and women, the reforms divided custodial 
establishments for remand and FRQYLFWHGSULVRQHUVLQ*HRUJLDLQWRµFORVHG¶DQGµVHPL-RSHQ¶
types. Closed prisons replaced colonies, accommodating prisoners in 6 to 8 person cells for 
23 hours of the day. Remand prisoners are also held in such facilities. Less highly securitized 
µVHPL-RSHQ¶SULVRQVZHUHDOVRHVWDEOLVKHG often on the grounds of the old penal colonies. In 
these semi-open facilities, prisoners have greater interaction and freedom of movement and in 
some prisoners are still kept in otryady, the collective dormitories of Soviet times (UNODC 
2013).  
The influence of the subculture of the thieves-in-law had been felt in Georgia more 
than in any other post-Soviet republic (Kupatadze 2012; Slade 2013). In legislation emulating 
an approach adopted in Italy for tackling the mafia, thieves-in-law and were removed from 
                                                          
7 More details on specific reforms can be found in Piacentini (2004, Pallot and Piacentini (2012), Slade (2012a; 
2012b; 2013)  
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prisons and placed in a separate institution (prison #7 in Tbilisi) with curtailed rights of 
visitation and access to phones. Privileges were taken away and administrative sanctions 
imposed for expressions of support for the thievish subculture. These reforms met with 
resistance inside the prison system. Riots and hunger strikes continually broke out in 2005 
and 2006, often directly before transfer to new or renovated facilities (Public Defender of 
Georgia 2007).  
Methods of spreading information in the communal spaces of the old system, such as 
tattooing, coded messages, slang, the keeping of a mutual aid communal fund, and an 
informal postal system were all outlawed. A small cadre of staff ran this reformed and 
volatile prison system at a staff-inmate ratio of roughly 1:10. Some prisons were significantly 
understaffed, populated by a professional corps that was undertrained (training courses last as 
little as 20 days), and overworked with non-proportional breaks for shift work (UNODC 
2013).  
It was in this context that the use of coercion, leading to widespread abuse and torture 
took hold, existing across prisons and principally in closed establishments and remand 
prisons (Open Society Georgia Foundation, forthcoming). After a change of government in 
2012, the prison system once more became an object of political intervention. Prison reform 
was declared a failure and a mass amnesty was announced. The courts reconsidered 
thousands of cases and over half of the prison population was released from penal institutions 
by March 2013. Reports of the new Ombudsman show that the system of elite prisoner 
µRYHUVHHUV¶KDGnot in fact been destroyed as the previous government had claimed but had 
been adapted to the new system (Slade 2013). Moreover, Ministry of Corrections officials 
now claim that the cultural frame of the thieves-in-law and their practices were still very 
much present in prison and making a resurgence following the amnesty. Carceral collectivism 
had proven much more resilient than the government had claimed. 
Russia  
Following the collapse of the USSR, criminal justice officials and human rights 
lawyers pronounced that penal reform would be swift, innovative and, importantly, mark a 
clear departure from the harsh Soviet penal and legal norms. In the process of dismantling the 
complex Soviet legal architecture in the decade after 1991 an avalanche of legislative 
measures appeared centered on the management and maintenance of human rights standards. 
Calls and campaigns from human rights groups to µHQGWKH*XODJ¶GLGLQGHHGSURYLGHPXFK
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for the Russian authorities to consider about the creaking edifice of Soviet penal architecture. 
However, it was the brutal hardship of the remand prisons, the SIZO, where the very worst 
human rights atrocities were documented. With the economic and financial chaos dominating 
Russian society under the then President Boris Yel¶Wsin for much of the ten years that 
followed the collapse of the USSR, the necessary first steps in the 1990s were (for sensible 
reasons) to embed European justice norms. To this extent, Russia has travelled very far 
indeed with compliance with many Council of Europe rules forthcoming. Within this new 
territory of penal change, however, imprisonment remained the default penal sanction (King 
1994). Organisational and economic reasons were again given for Russia not implementing 
alternatives to custody, and there were no reforms or re-structuring of prison architecture. 
Russia remains in the top three of the highest prison populations in the world (per 100,000 
people) and the total number of prisoners often exceeds the capacities of pre-trial detention 
facilities and correctional institutions. 7KH 6RYLHW µSULVRQ complex¶ in other words, has 
endured.  
Exploring the enduring legacy of carceral collectivism, and its relationship to penal 
reform, requires a consideration of the pressing question: if not penal collectivism, then 
what? Providing alternatives to Soviet-style imprisonment (en masse accommodation in 
otryad halls, double wooden fences, watch towers and barbed wire) has not been 
forthcoming. Such reluctance is significant not only because alternatives to custody would be 
the first step towards ending the penal echoes of the Gulag, but also the high penal population 
would be reduced. Supervised release was mentioned as long ago as 1997 in the new 
Criminal Code that became statute. In its original version it was intended that supervised 
release should be served in so-FDOOHG³FRUUHFWLRQDOFHQWHUV´ with prisoners staying in special 
hostels without guard but under supervision of the authorities in charge of sentence 
management. However, the government did not approve funds or staff for these correctional 
facilities. Amnesties have reduced the prison population in a very piecemeal way but it was 
not until December 2010 ZLWKWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRIWKHµ&RQFHSW3DSHUIRUWKH5HIRUPRI3ULVRQ
,QVWLWXWLRQV LQ WKH 5XVVLDQ )HGHUDWLRQ XQWLO ¶ that conditional sentences, holistic 
approaches and probation surfaced once again. 
The Concept paper marked four years of penal reform discussions in an effort to end 
5XVVLD¶VQRWRULRXVUHSXWDWLRQand, µLPSURYHWKHHIIHFWLYHRSHUDWLRQRISHQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDQG
punishment, to meet international standards and to ensure public safety (Concept paper, p.6). 
Minor to medium offences, it is stated, will be addressed by non-custodial measures to ensure 
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public safety, reduction in the level of crime in society, fragmentation of the criminal 
community and reduction in the number of the persons kept in penal institutiRQV¶7RDFKLHYH
these goals there would be fines, an improvement of the legislation governing alternatives to 
create inspectorates that are community-facing, and, interestingly, more robust engagement 
of local self-government bodies and the general public (see section 4,2.1). Unfortunately, 
only a very small number of offences could be covered through a fine penalty system and 
alternatives to custody could not be sustained economically. Of key note is that Russia did 
not create the probation service it needs, so dealing with most offenders remains in the 
domain of the penal system.  The adoption of parts of the Concept, as revealed from data on 
re-offending rates, has also had almost no impact on court practice and many essential 
provisions of the Concept remain unimplemented (Utkin, 2013).  However, a need to address 
the culture of collectivism, and fragment the criminal community, (Concept, p. 6-8) was, for 
the first time since the collapse of the USSR, the clearest reference to carceral collectivism, 
albeit in an indirect way: 
 
 µ...there will be new penal establishments that fulfil the legal requirements of punishment, 
and the deprivation of liberty, but which will be a move away from the barrack system of 
KRXVLQJSULVRQHUV¶ (Concept paper, p.6).  
 
7KLVFRPPHQWZDVQRWDUHIHUHQFHWR5XVVLD¶VFXOWXUDODWWDFKPHQWWRFROOHFWLYLVPbut was an 
attempt to publicly address the on-going problem of criminal gangs. 0RYLQJ µDZD\ IURP
EDUUDFN V\VWHP¶ is a formidable challenge. It means changing the spatio-temporal 
choreography of penal discipline and how power and control are maintained. Moreover, it 
requires a re-configuration of the organising principles of punishment in Russia because it is 
inscribed in the physical architecture. These issues, intimately part of the culture and 
practices of carceral collectivism, have, up to this point, not been addressed by reform.  
In both Georgia and Russia, wide-ranging attempts at prison reform failed to radically 
alter the features of carceral collectivism that define prison life for prisoners. Below we 
examine why carceral collectivism has survived in the two of the most reformed penal 
systems in the post-Soviet region. 
 
 
Architecture and Attachment: the Resilience of Carceral Collectivism in Georgia and Russia  
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In both Georgia and Russia, despite attempts to make significant reform, prisoners still find 
themselves in regimes that are marked by legacies of carceral collectivism. This is not just 
due to a lack of robustness in reform. Rather, the forms of penal governance that constitute 
carceral collectivism have proven resilient in the face of pressure. Resilience, defined as the 
ability of some entity or institution to survive under pressure from an exogenous intervention 
or adapt and continue on in the wake of a shock (Gunderson 2000; Levin et al. 1998) is a key 
property of carceral collectivism and one that prison reform has not managed to overcome.  
In this section, we examine two important elements that help constitute this resilience. 
Firstly, architectural forms continue to incubate carceral collectivism. Secondly, prisoners 
and administrators have an attachment to this punishment form. In the language of political 
science, there is both a logic of instrumentality and a logic of appropriateness to the practices 
of carceral collectivism that sustain it (March and Olsen 1996). This means that, first, for all 
involved there are rational incentives in maintaining the frames for order and social life that 
carceral collectivism provides. Second, there is a degree of cultural attachment to carceral 
collectivism as a form of punishment. Before coming to this issue of attachment, we now turn 
to architecture. 
Carceral collectivism is resilient, in part, because no reform has gone far enough in 
destroying its physical manifestations found in architecture and the structure of social life that 
this engenders. During the Soviet era, the architecture of prisons attempted to bring about a 
seamless cohesion between penal ideology, broadly defined, and the cultural aspirations of 
the regime. Despite two decades of reform, Russia has so far resisted reform towards Western 
style cellular prisons, though its new reform plan to 2020 intends this. For now, very few 
prisoners are held in cells (only those in jails, tyurmy, and in the strictest regime colonies for 
men); the vast majority are still held in penal colonies or kolonniye corresponding to the 
zoned military detachments of the post-Gulag Soviet era8. In Georgia, there is now a mix of 
prisoners held in cells (closed prisons) and semi-open prisons that have remnants of carceral 
collectivist architecture and governance philosophies. The continual presence of mutual 
surveillance and the re-casting of prisoners into administrative roles, creating a form of 
collective penal self-governance, still mark both these systems. 
The architectural setting of post-Soviet prison holds within it particular forms of 
social institutions: roles, modes of interaction and normative ordering are defined and 
                                                          
8 See Pallot and Piacentini (2012) for a full breakdown of contemporary Russian penal architecture. 
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maintained. ,Q 5XVVLD¶V SULVRQ VRFLHW\ WKH FROOHFWLYLVDWLRQ RI SHQDO OLIH LV UHIOHFWed in the 
internal spatio-temporal infrastructure (zoning, collective living, and timed work tasks and 
daily roll-call checks), which maintain the hierarchies of power between inmates. As we have 
argued, a systematic effect of Soviet penal architecture was to induce a high level of 
enhanced surveillance, the polyopticon of all watching all. Maintaining carceral collectivism, 
therefore, requires many things from prisoners that are borrowed from the past: collectives of 
work teams, discipline groups, carers, informant cliques and administrators. In Russia, larger 
associative groups come together based on tasks and work-placements as well as places of 
birth. The most authoritative position, conferred by the latter-day version of the kollektiv, is 
µhead prefect¶ who is the prisoner with devolved responsibility for managing the dormitory 
when the prison officers go home. Then the so-called aktivisti RUµDFWLYLVWV¶manage the self-
organised collectives9. The official line is that the DFWLYLVWV¶ role is to empower and teach 
prisoners to learn to raise issues amongst themselves. The positions of authority that prisoners 
occupy heighten the collective experience. Becoming part of a collective, for some, means 
PXFKPRUHWKDQEHLQJDµSHUVRQ¶ (Pallot and Piacentini, 2012).  
Captains and Deputies look after the interests of the prison administrators, and in the 
barracks the supervisors can mete out punishment and also inform on fellow prisoners, 
creating a kind of inverted and complex role for prisoners in the collective environment that 
relocates the centre of penal power straight into the heart of the living quarters. In practice, 
however, self-governance is contradictory. Some view prisoner authority DVDµVHOORXW¶ZKLOVW
others believe that it is better to have prisoners assist in prisoner over-sight. Pallot and 
3LDFHQWLQL¶VUHVHDUFKVXJJHVWVWKDWLQ5XVVLDROGHUSULVRQHUVZKRJUHZXSLQ6RYLHW
Russia, recalled a golden age of confinement when the lines between those who worked for 
the administration and those who resisted were much clearer. 
To a lesser extent than in Russia, many prisons still architecturally operate in part or 
in full along collectivist lines in Georgia too. Semi-open facilities still maintain dormitory 
µ]RQHV¶ WKRXJK WKH SURGXFWLRQ DQG LQGXVWU\ ]RQHV QRZ OLH GRUPDQW DQG RXWVLGH WKH SULVRQ
fence. Ksani #15 for example exhibits both a Soviet block with one building holding 500 
people in dormitories, while nearby a newly built block of the closed type holds prisoners in 
six person cells. Such institutions embody the halfway house character of the Georgian 
reforms, exhibiting an attempt to break with the past while at the same time manifesting the 
                                                          
9 The term descends directly from the Gulag era when the aktiv was the prisoner who was given extra powers 
from the authorities. 
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clear physical vestiges of Soviet collectivist punishment. While prisoners might have greater 
privacy in the closed cell system, they are also denied access to the talk and exchange of the 
old dormitories. Prisoners go to extraordinary lengths to find information on each other in the 
strictly controlled environment of the reformed, closed prison system, continually tapping 
and making small holes in walls and passing along messages and questions along an entire 
floor or wing.   
In Georgia, prior to reform, a system of µoverseers¶ existed. An individual overseer 
reported to the elite criminal caste, thieves-in-law. They could watch over and resolve 
disputes arising from card games and gambling, look after individual dormitories, while more 
authoritative individuals had responsibility for whole barrack buildings, zones and the prison 
itself. This system was largely dismantled in closed type prisons from 2005 onwards. In such 
prisons WKHQRWLRQRI µRYHUVHHU¶ (working with the criminal elite) and µLQIRUPDQW¶ (working 
with the prison administration) became blurred such that there were extreme difficulties in 
working out which prisoners might be informants when entering a closed cell after the space 
and interaction of the open colonies. In semi-open camps however the notion of overseer 
persists. In these prisons overseers remain highly conspicuous and are presumed to be there 
for the welfare of the prisoners.  
The issue of architecture and its role in structuring social life is of comparative 
interest. As Hancock and Jewkes (2011) note, the architecture of cellular confinement, 
common to most Western prisons, can have the debilitating effect of de-stabilising prisoners 
through physical isolation from others. Beijersbergen et al. (2014) found that prisoner 
attitudes concerning relationships with staff were worse in panopticon prison designs and best 
LQ µFDPSXV¶VW\OHSULVRQV WKDW IRVWHUHGJUHDWHU LQWHUDFWLRQWestern penal architecture today 
predominantly follows a cellular model that originated in the design of monasteries where 
austerity and lack of privacy necessitated small cells of one or two prisoners. Prison 
architects implemented a rehabilitation concept that promoted isolated, silent contemplation 
(Brand, 1975). A cultural specificity of Western imprisonment is how power over prisoners 
was secured. The mental uncertainty implicit in prisoners not knowing when they are being 
watched was promoted as a crucial advancement because it ensured automatic power over 
prisoners by authorities. Prison design has since been updated to include environmental and 
health concerns but, as is also the case in Georgia and Russia, visibility is key to control and 
discipline.  
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Over and above the issue of architecture, the resilience of carceral collectivism is also 
constituted by cultural attachment to it among prisoners. This can manifest itself as active 
resistance to reform. In both Russia and Georgia, prisoners have engaged in collective forms 
of resistance in protest at being moved from camps to cellular prisons. For example, in 
Georgia LQ 0DUFK  VHYHQ SULVRQHUV ORVW WKHLU OLYHV GXULQJ D SULVRQ ULRW LQ 7ELOLVL¶V
notorious Ortachala facility after the action was put down by special forces (Public Defender 
of Georgia 2007). Just months before this, in December 2005, a massive hunger strike 
involving around 70% of the entire prison population had broken out (Regnum 2005). The 
GHPDQGV ZHUH D UHWXUQ WR WKH ROG V\VWHP RI µRYHUVHHUV¶ WKH XVH RI PRELOH SKRQHV DQG WR
remain in the old prison facilities. Disturbances in the Russian penal system during the most 
recent attempt to implement the 2020 reform program were one of the main reasons the 
reforms were halted. 
Carceral collectivism is a culturally readable frame for social action. It is an 
understandable way of punishing and becomes a form of accepted common sense (Garland 
1990). Carceral collectivism then ensures stability in everyday prison life according to 
complex normative templates. Thus, for example, collectivism produces rules for the 
circulation of information about any QHZFRPHU¶V FKDUDFWHU KLV/her attitude towards the 
prison society and prison life, and, lastly, the demands to be placed upon him by the 
collective. This information enables the formation and sustenance of groups. Norms 
concerning group living and the suppression of egoistic behaviour engenders stability 
generating the informal rules that frame mutual obligations, reciprocity and dispute 
resolution. Attempts to dismantle the old system provoke resistance as it does damage to 
what individuals understand punishment is and what it should be as well as the specific 
methods prisoners develop to negotiate the pains of imprisonment.  
The communal living arrangements of the detachment block create the formation of 
small social groups of varying hierarchical status. In Russia, in the low status groups of 2-8 
prisoners unity is maintaLQHGWKURXJKµORDIVKDULQJ¶ RUµIDPLO\FRKHVLRQ¶. In classic Goffman 
(1968) terms, both are positively social psychological (they distil emotional comfort) and 
negatively destabilising WKH\ FDQ QHYHU IXOO\ VDWLVI\ D SULVRQHU¶V QHHG WR IHHO WUXVW Dnd be 
trusted). While smaller hierarchical groups are common, Oleinik (2003), in his study of 
Soviet and post-Soviet male penal colonies shows the importance of µFRPLQJIURPWKHVDPH
SODFH¶RUzemliachestvo in the forming of larger associations. Group formation becomes, in 
one sense, a marker of discrimination, superiority and fear and also an ability to manage the 
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penal collective according to regional stereotypes. Prisoners in Georgia also form subgroups 
from the regions of this small but incredibly diverse country. Prisoners feel that there are few 
bonds of real trust or solidarity and thus gravitate to people of common origin for support. 
Crucially, in a small, tight knit country like Georgia prisoners rely on common origins for 
character references, once again producing information that helps categorise, order, and make 
demands on newcomers in the complex world of the collectivist prison system.  
While carceral collectivism has endured, it is a system of collective penal self-
governance that also faces the possibility of abuse and manipulation because it delivers what 
the regimes require - discipline, and a culturally familiar form of peer-surveillance. For some 
then, there are sunk investments in maintaining the collective system from which they 
benefit, both from the side of the officers and among certain sections of the prisoner 
population. This is not limited to prisoner-on-prisoner abuse but extends to preying on the 
weaker prison officers to bring in alcohol, drugs and perfumes into the colonies (Pallot and 
Piacentini, 2012). In Russia, prison authorities feel confident that sufficient checks and 
balances are in place to ensure that protocol is followed when devolving authority to 
prisoners. However, power imbalances remain non-linear and opaque. The reform of 
*HRUJLD¶V SULVRQV has increased uncertainty in prison management and therefore levels of 
coercion and violence from staff to prisoners. Meanwhile the reforms have reinforced the 
need for prisoner self-organization and created adaptive new forms of information gathering 
and informal governance.  
Carceral collectivism has proven highly resilient. For Kharkhordin (1999), however, 
the image of collectivism contains within it too many contradictions and possibilities for 
abuse to be seen as a meaningful alternative form of self-organization. Whether carceral 
collectivism, might, ZLWKWKHULJKWSROLFLHVEHWUDQVIRUPHGLQWRDµJRRGWKLQJ¶± an inclusive, 
supportive and dignified social form of prison order - particularly in light of Western 
critiques of cellular-based punishment is something we explore in conclusion. For the 
moment, a key question of policy, which we do not have space to address here, is: in the story 
of post-Soviet penal change, why has the issue of collectivism been mainly omitted from the 
reform project?   
 
Conclusion: Collectivism, Western penology and the post-Soviet Region 
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Carceral collectivism endures as a Soviet legacy, as a penal institutional form, and in wider 
discourse, because it makes for a FHUWDLQNLQGRIµFRPPRQVHQVH¶,WEULQJVFXOWXUDOFRKHUHQFH 
and is resilient because it is part of the cultural imaginary of the post-Soviet region. It is a 
penal style that peers into the heart of wider society. Embedded cultural attachment to a 
particular punishment form, reflected in architectural design, creates obstacles to successful 
prison reform in post-Soviet Georgia and Russia. This view VXSSRUWV*DUODQG¶V
argument that µpenal practices are shaped by the symbolic grammar of cultural forms as well 
as by the more instrumental dynamics of social action, so that, in analysing punishment, we 
should look for patterns of cultural expression as well as logics of material interest or social 
FRQWURO¶*DUODQG, our emphasis). While the cultural dimension of punishment in 
general has been long recognized (Garland 1990: 250; Smith 2008), this paper focuses on 
how culture can impede the progress of well-intentioned prison reform. Moreover, this paper 
is a rare attempt to analyse this process in a non-Western setting.  
The cases presented here are important for reformers whether in the West or in the 
post-Soviet region. Hancock and Jewkes¶ LPSRUWDQW VWXG\RIWestern prison design (2011) 
notes that the prison is not merely an extension of state power where norms and meanings can 
be found in penal practice. The prison is also, within its exterior and interior design, an 
incubator of bold statements about the modernization process itself. The architecture of 
prison institutions enables insights into how prisoners encounter power and the effects of 
these encounters on creating meaning from confinement. Alongside delivering punishment, 
prison spaces also organise the social life of captives and this means that prison design must 
be socially, culturally and politically compatible with the aspirations and goals of the 
institution. Related to this point, aesthetic principles are now being applied to prison design to 
create SXQLVKPHQW IRUPV µDOORZLQJ WKH SULQFLSOH RI FROODERUDWLRQ WR WDNH SUHFHGHQFH RYHU
LVRODWLRQDQGLQGLYLGXDOL]DWLRQ¶(Hancock and Jewkes, 2011: 619).  
Hancock and Jewkes argue that better aesthetics and more communality push against 
the over-arching, indeed emblematic, goals of social control and discipline. If the µQHZ
JHQHUDWLRQ SULVRQV¶ IRXQG LQ 1RUWKHUQ (XURSH DUH LQWHQGHG WR IUHH XS movement between 
staff and prisoners and be less confrontational in design (Ibid; Beijersbergen et al. 2014), the 
question arises as to whether prison design reform towards collectivism, might, therefore, 
capture a more progressive, less harmful approach to punishment. This is a question for 
reformers in both the West and the post-Soviet region. For policy-makers in the latter, the 
emphasis has been on a quick move towards Western cellular prisons. In the former, recent 
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prison design has aimed to reduce aliHQDWLRQLQSULVRQDQGFUHDWHDµFDPSXV¶IHHOLQGD\-to-
day life. Reform in the two regions is then moving in opposite directions, yet there is little 
dialogue on what each could learn from the other. Comparative research is required to 
explore the question of what type of penal environment may be fostered by what forms of 
collectivism. 
From the Western perspective, moves towards collectivism might learn from the 
Soviet experience by looking at the form of order that emerged in Soviet camps. 
Paradoxically for us, the collectivist nature of penal punishment in the Soviet state was an 
enhanced panopticism which goes beyond the Foucauldian all-seeing-eye towards something 
a little more peculiar: a single prisoner is watched by all prisoners ± the polyopticon. 
+DQFRFN DQG -HZNHV¶ thesis on penal architecture in Western prisons suggests that 
DUFKLWHFWXUDO PRGHUQLVDWLRQ LQ VRPH RI WRGD\¶V SULVRQV is seen - by penal administrators, 
architects and government officials - as innovations towards new and better environments. 
However, RXUFDVHVDOVRFDXWLRQWKDWZKDWLVµEHWWHU¶FDQEHUHVLVWHGE\SULVRQHUVSRVVHVVLQJ
specific cultural understandings of how punishment should be practiced, experienced and 
negotiated. 
Lastly from the post-Soviet perspective, reformers might ask whether all elements of 
Western penal models are desirable. Certainly, as a cultural trope carceral collectivism 
contains many of the contradictions inherent in ideas of (Soviet) collectivism. These continue 
to haunt both Georgian and Russian penal systems. Yet, post-Soviet Georgian and Russian 
penal discourse has yet to recognise how collectivism fosters at least the possibility for a 
more benign, pastoral and supportive culture of communality. In Russia and Georgia this 
culture is ingrained in the penal and cultural psyche. Post-Soviet societies are now folded into 
the European space. They exist at a point of international penal exceptionality in terms of 
penal culture, penal infrastructure and penal practices but, with culturally sensitive reform, 
this could yet yield inclusive, supportive, social and benign punishment forms.  
While ending on this note of cautionary optimism, we highlight the fact here that such 
reform would have to deal fully with the startlingly high incarceration rates in the post-Soviet 
region and the lack of alternatives to prison. We do not have space to consider such matters 
here. Suffice it to say that mass incarceration in many post-Soviet countries endures because 
prison still signifies a much more capacious notion of a socially and economically useful 
commune ± a further legacy of Soviet carceral collectivism. The more basic question for us 
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then is whether Georgia and Russia are ready to move their prison systems towards 
something that engages with the past, meaningfully comes from internal public and political 
conversations, and is concerned with maintaining the safety, human rights, dignity and 
privacy of all prisoners.  
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